Lavardo Smith’s minimum term reduced from 30 to 24 years, while Misael Castillo and Stanford Forbes Jr. see theirs reduced to 22 years each after Court finds old parole law, legitimate expectations and rehabilitation should have been properly considered
Thursday 19th August, 2026 – PROVIDENCIALES, Turks and Caicos Islands — Three men serving life sentences for two separate murders have won significant parts of their appeals before the Turks and Caicos Islands Court of Appeal, resulting in substantial reductions to the periods they must serve before becoming eligible to be considered for parole.
Lavardo Smith, who was convicted of murdering barmaid Santa Ramirez during an armed robbery in 2011, had his minimum parole eligibility period reduced from 30 years to 24 years. Misael Castillo and Stanford Forbes Jr., who were jointly convicted of murdering Anthony Quinn in 2012, each had their minimum periods reduced from 30 years to 22 years. Importantly, none of the men had their murder convictions overturned and none received a determinate sentence replacing their life imprisonment. Their life sentences remain in force, with the Court changing only the minimum periods they must serve before becoming eligible to be considered for parole.
The consolidated appeal was heard on March 12 and 16, 2026, before Court of Appeal President Justice Alice Yorke-Soo Hon, Justice Bernard Turner and Justice Sandra Minott-Phillips, with judgment delivered on July 29. Oliver Smith KC and Kimone Tennant represented Lavardo Smith, Lara Maroof appeared for Castillo, Sheena Mair represented Forbes and Tamika Grant appeared for the Crown.
The case is particularly important because it deals not simply with three convicted men seeking lower sentences, but with what the Court described as a fundamental fairness issue created when the Turks and Caicos Islands changed its parole legislation in 2020.
At the time these murders were committed, a person serving life imprisonment for murder could become eligible to be considered for parole after serving not less than 10 years. When the Parole of Prisoners (Amendment) Act 2020 came into force, the law established a new minimum period of 30 years before a person serving life for murder could ordinarily become eligible for parole, subject to exceptional aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
Smith, Castillo and Forbes had all committed their offences years before that amendment. Yet each was subsequently returned to the Supreme Court and given a 30-year minimum term under the new regime.
The Court of Appeal has now held that the sentencing process applied to them was flawed in several important respects.
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PART ONE: THE LAW CHANGED AFTER THEY WERE ALREADY SERVING LIFE SENTENCES
The central controversy began with the difference between the law in force when these murders occurred and the law introduced years later.
Under the former Parole of Prisoners Ordinance, the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the Parole Board and after consulting the Chief Justice, could order the release on licence of a person serving life imprisonment after that person had served at least 10 years.
That did not mean a prisoner was automatically released after 10 years. It meant the prisoner became eligible to be considered for release.
The distinction is important.
A life prisoner appearing before the Parole Board after 10 years could still be refused parole and remain imprisoned. The Board would consider matters including the offence, behaviour in prison, health, personal circumstances and other relevant information before making any recommendation.
The 2020 amendment dramatically changed that position. For murder, the new statutory period became 30 years before eligibility for release on licence, unless exceptional circumstances justified moving that period upward or downward.
The legislation also contained transitional provisions directing that existing life prisoners be brought back before the Supreme Court so that minimum terms could be fixed.
It was through this process that Smith, Castillo and Forbes eventually found themselves facing 30-year minimum terms despite having committed their crimes when the law contemplated parole consideration after 10 years.
Their lawyers argued, in different ways, that this produced an unfair and legally problematic result.
COURT FINDS THE OLD LAW MATTERED
One of the Court of Appeal’s most significant conclusions was that these prisoners should not simply have been treated as though their murders were committed after the 2020 law took effect.
The judges considered the protection contained in section 6(4) of the Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution, which prevents the imposition of a criminal penalty more severe than what could have been imposed under the law at the time the offence was committed.
After reviewing authorities from the Privy Council, European human-rights jurisprudence and other cases concerning changes to parole regimes, the Court concluded that applying the 30-year regime to prisoners whose offences occurred before January 8, 2020 created a constitutional problem.
The Court found that when Smith, Castillo and Forbes committed their murders, the applicable law allowed eligibility for parole after 10 years. Requiring them retrospectively to serve 30 years before even being considered represented a heavier consequence than the law provided at the time of their offences.
This did not mean the Court concluded they should automatically be released after 10 years.
It meant the sentencing court was required to approach their cases under the legal framework that applied when the offences were committed and then determine a just minimum term based upon the seriousness of the crimes, aggravating factors, mitigating circumstances and each man’s individual situation.
That distinction ultimately became central to the appeal.
THE “RULES OF THE RACE” HAD CHANGED
The Court drew heavily on earlier decisions examining what happens when a prisoner has spent years working toward parole under one legal system, only to discover that the rules have changed while the sentence is being served.
One of the authorities repeatedly discussed was Flynn and Others, where judges spoke about the unfairness of moving the prospect of release further away after a prisoner had already begun progressing toward it.
The Court of Appeal applied similar reasoning here.
Smith, Castillo and Forbes had each spent years believing they could begin the parole process around the 10-year stage. That belief was not simply something they invented themselves. Prison and parole authorities had, in varying degrees, helped them prepare for that process.
The judges concluded that their expectations rested on sufficiently solid foundations that they had to be taken seriously during resentencing.
For Smith, the position was especially strong.
He had gone beyond merely preparing a parole application.
He had already appeared before the Parole Board.
SMITH HAD ALREADY SAT BEFORE THE PAROLE BOARD
Smith submitted his parole application in February 2022 after believing that he had reached the stage where he could be considered for release.
He was then actually brought before the Parole Board and questioned about matters including where he would live and work if released. At the end of that hearing, he was told that the Board would consider the application and inform him of its decision.
According to the judgment, Smith was never told by prison authorities, the Parole Board or anyone else that the law had changed in a way that could radically affect his eligibility.
Instead, while waiting for the result of his parole application, he found himself being brought back before the Supreme Court for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal concluded that his case fell directly within the transitional protection for prisoners whose parole matters were already pending. The judges disagreed with the original resentencing judge’s conclusion that Smith had no legitimate expectation capable of affecting sentence.
The Court described Smith’s position as stronger than that of the other two appellants because he had already reached the hearing stage.
For the judges, that mattered significantly when deciding how much weight his expectation should receive.
CASTILLO HAD PREPARED FOR RELEASE
Castillo had similarly spent years looking toward the 10-year point.
By 2022, he had completed approximately a decade in custody. The judgment records that he submitted a parole application along with job letters and proof of accommodation and met with the relevant rehabilitation personnel.
His institutional record was also significant.
Castillo had been trusted to undertake work outside the prison, including maintenance work at the Grand Turk Police Station and duties at the Governor’s residence. He was reportedly able to assist during functions at Waterloo House and return to prison after completing his work without being subjected to the type of restrictions usually associated with a prisoner considered a serious escape or security risk.
He had also completed self-development programmes, including anger-management work.
After preparing for parole, however, Castillo discovered that his name was not listed for the hearing. He made enquiries and was initially told he would have to wait for another hearing. It was only later that he learned he was being returned to court for resentencing under the changed law.
The Court found that this history gave Castillo a legitimate expectation that the 10-year parole regime would apply to him.
FORBES NEVER EVEN GOT TO FILE HIS APPLICATION
Forbes’ circumstances were somewhat different.
He also expected to become eligible for parole after serving the required period, and prison authorities had assisted in preparing him for that process. However, before his application could reach the Parole Board, the resentencing proceedings intervened.
His case also became tangled in delays and missing court materials.
The judgment records problems surrounding Legal Aid representation, the availability of trial transcripts and the inability to locate the original pre-sentence report. Forbes was eventually resentenced in October 2024, almost five years after the 2020 law came into effect.
His lawyer, Sheena Mair, argued that those procedural problems and delays should themselves have resulted in a further reduction.
The Court rejected that particular ground, finding that the failure to transmit every case record in the exact manner contemplated by the legislation did not automatically invalidate the resentencing process. It also held that Forbes had not demonstrated sufficient prejudice flowing from the delay itself.
Nevertheless, the Court accepted the much larger argument that Forbes, like Smith and Castillo, had developed a legitimate expectation through the conduct of the authorities and that his progress toward release had to be considered fairly.
More to come in Part #2 of this resentencing of three convicted murderers.
